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NOTES 
Reaffirming the Freedom of the Press: Another Look at 
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo 
Toward the close of its 1973 term, a unanimous Supreme Court 
struck do,m under the first amendment a Florida statute that re-
quired newspapers to give free reply space to political candidates 
whom they had attacked in their columns.1 The Court's opinion re-
affirmed the principle that the first amendment erects "a virtually 
insurmountable barrier"2 between government and the press. The 
Court's acceptance and use of this proposition, however, did not 
address the specific arguments raised by the statute's defenders. Con-
stitutional scholars and politicians3 had embraced the concepts of 
reply and access to the press4 as an answer to the threat posed to first 
amendment freedoms by monopolistic concentration in the news-
paper industry. While the Court did devote nearly half of its opinion 
to a description of the first amendment theory of the access advo-
cates, 5 it dismissed that theory summarily, as contrary to precedent. 
1. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). FLA. STAT, ANN, 
§ 104.38 (Supp. 1973-1974), originally enacted in 1913, provided: 
H any newspaper in its columns assails the personal character of any candidate for 
nomination or for election, or charges said candidate with malfeasance or misfea-
sance in office, or otherwise attacks his official record, or gives to another free space 
for such putposes, such newspaper shall upon request of such candidate imme-
diately publish free of cost any reply he may make thereto in as conspicuous a 
place and in the same kind of type as the matter that calls for such reply, provided 
such reply does not take up more space than the matter replied to. Anr, person 
or firm failing to comply with the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanor of the first degree • • • • 
A lower court held the statute unconstitutionally vague, and thus invalid under the 
due process and free press clauses. State v. News-Journal Corp., 36 Fla. Supp, 164 
(Volusia County J. Ct. 1972). The Florida circuit court's opinion in Tornillo noted that 
the Attorney General of Florida decided not to appeal the News-Journal decision 
because he had the same reservations regarding the statute's constitutionality. A 1972 
bill in the Florida state legislature attempted to repeal the reply statute but died in 
committee. Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 287 S.2d 78, 81 n.8 (Fla. 1973). 
2. 418 U.S. at 259. {White, J., concurring). 
3. See J. BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM? (1973); N.Y. Times, June 26, 
1974, at 1, coL 6 (late city ed.); id. at 18, cols. 3-8; id., April 24, 1974, at 41, cols. 2-3 
(late city ed.). 
4. For putposes of this note "right of access" refers both to the right of spokesmen 
on various public issues to present their views in mass media and to a right of reply, 
whereby the medium allows response to a previously offered view. Distinctions between 
reply and access will appear where necessary for clarification. 
5. Despite the amount of space dedicated to a delineation of the pro-access argu• 
ment, the Court neither explained nor pretended to explain the entire case for 
"opening up" the press, Chief Justice Burger referred his audience to a recent article 
that summarized the basic position of access advocates. See Lange, The Role of the 
Access Doctrine in the Regulation of the Mass Media: A Critical Review and Assess-
ment, 52 N.C. L. REv. I (1973). 42 U.S.LW. at 5100. In the past few years numerous 
commentators have suggested that the standards for access to other media be applied 
to newspapers. See, e.g., J. BARRON, supra note 3; Barron, Access-The Only Choice for 
[186] 
Notes 187 
This note does not take issue with the result of the decision. 
Rather, the argument herein is that the access theory deserves more 
complete consideration. The Court used first amendment precedents 
to strike down the reply statute without exploring whether the ra-
tionale behind these precedents mandated such a result. In an effort 
to justify more fully the Court's conclusion, this note will first present 
the underlying rationale of the pro-access argument. It will then 
analyze the constitutionality of statutes that would implement a 
right of access. Finally, the note will discuss several practical difficul-
ties that access legislation would present. 
The controversy that ultimately brought the access theory to the 
Supreme Court6 began when the Miami Herald refused Pat Tomillo, 
a candidate for the Florida state legislature, space to rebut the paper's 
editorial criticisms of his public actions. The Herald thereby violated 
the Florida "right to reply" statute, which required a newspaper to 
provide free space for the reply of any candidate whose personal 
character or official record it had assailed. 7 In a per curiam opinion 
the Florida supreme court reversed a state circuit court ruling that 
the statute infringed upon the freedom of the press guarantees of the 
United States and Florida Constitutions.8 
the Media?, 48 TEXAS L. REv. 766 (1970); Barron, Access to the Press-A New First 
Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1641, 1663-66 (1967); Barron, An Emerging First 
Amendment Right of Access to the Media?, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 487, 493-502 (1969); 
Ervin, Media and the First Amendment in a Free Society, 60 GEO. L.J. 871, 882-83 (1972); 
Note, The Duty of Newspapers To Accept Political Advertising-An Attack on Tradi-
tion, 44 IND. L.J. 222, 231-32 (1969); Note, Monopoly Newspapers: Troubles in Paradise, 
7 SAN DIEGO L. R.Ev. 268, 284-88 (1970); Note, Resolving the Free Speech-Free Press 
Dichotomy: Access to the Press Through Advertising, 22 U. FLA. L. REv. 293, 298-99, 
314-15 (1969); Note, Free Speech and the Mass Media, 57 VA. L. REv. 636, 650-53 (1971). 
6. Extensive scholarly discussion of access predated the Tomillo decision. Zechariah 
Chafee, writing for the Commission on Freedom of the Press, reports that 
[i]n 1939 Max Lerner proposed official machinery to control fraud in the opinion 
industries. J. B. S. Hardman, veteran editor of a New York trade-union daily 
newspaper, elaborated the idea into a Free Press Authority to regulate the entire 
network of the instrumentalities of communication wherever large capitalizations 
are a threat. The Authority would exercise wide powers. It would set up a system 
of registry of licensing for publishing newspapers and periodicals. Though leaving 
journals free to say what they wish and thus supposedly satisfying the Bill of 
Rights, it would perform the purpose of assuring the maintenance of open space 
and opportunity for free, unliampered expression of opinion by citizens which 
differed from the opinions held by publishers and advanced in their papers. 
Z. CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MAss COMMUNICATIONS 694-95 (1947). See also Donnelly, 
The Right of Reply: An Alternative to an Action for Libel, 34 VA. L. REv. 868, 896-900 
(1948). The Supreme Court of Mississippi largely vitiated that state's right of reply 
statute, Mrss. CoDE. ANN. § 3175 (1942), in Manasco v. Walley, 216 Miss. 614, 63 S.2d 
91 (1953). Nevada repealed a similar statute, NEV. REv. STAT. § 200.570 (1963), in 1969, 
replacing it with a retraction statute. 
7. FLA. STAT • .ANN. § 104.38 (Supp. 1973-1974). See note 1 supra. 
8. Tomillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 287 S.2d 78 (Fla. 1973), reversing 38 
Fla. Supp. 80 (Dade County Cir. Ct. 1972). In a brief dissent Judge Boyd attacked both 
the statute's vagueness and its consequences for first amendment rights. Although he 
acknowledged the offensiveness of certain stories in the press, the judge explained that 
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The Florida high court accepted the access advocates' contention 
that the dominant purpose of the first amendment guarantee of free-
public attack is "the price one pays for success or notoriety," and denied that "the 
muzzling of a free press is ••• the solution to the problem." 287 S.2d at 89. Boyd 
stated that veracity was the duty of a free press and would only be diminished by 
compulsion to print. 287 S.2d at 89. 
The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "Congress shall 
make no law ••• abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press •••• " The Supreme 
Court applied this prohibition to the states through the fourteenth amendment in 
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). Article I, section 4, of the Florida Constitution 
provides: "Every person may speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects 
but shall be responsible for the abuse of that right. No law shall be passed to restrain 
or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press •••• " A lower state court had earlier 
declared the statute unconstitutional, State v. News-Journal Corp., 36 Fla. Supp. 164 
(Volusia County J. Ct. 1972), but no appeal was taken to the state supreme court. See 
note l supra. 
Several days before the Florida supreme court announced the Tornillo decision, 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court also confronted the issue of reply statutes. 
Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, - Mass. -, 298 N.E.2d 829 (1973). The 
Massachusetts General Assembly had considered a bill similar in many respects to 
the Florida statute. The Massachusetts bill forbade any newspaper or periodical of 
general circulation to refuse publication of a paid advertisement for political candi-
dates or questions to be submitted to voters if the advertisement responded to an ad 
previously published in the newspaper or periodical. A second section of the bill would 
have required the journal to charge identical rates for display of political and com• 
mercial advertisements. 
Aside from the addition of rate regulations and the extension of reply rights to 
spokesmen for questions submitted to voters, the Massachusetts bill differed from the 
Florida statute in that (1) space for responsive advertisements had to be paid for rather 
than provided free of charge; (2) periodicals other than newspapers were subject to 
regulation; (3) the right of reply did not extend to editorial attacks but was limited to 
paid political advertisements; and (4) violators of the proposed bill would have incurred 
civil rather than criminal penalties. In response to a series of questions that the State 
Senate had propounded concerning the validity of the proposed bill, the court enun-
ciated the concept that the first amendment is a means of aiding the dissemination of 
information. - Mass. at-, 298 N.E.2d at 833. While the Supreme Judicial Court noted 
that prior decisions had almost unanimously upheld a newspaper's right to reject 
advertising, - Mass. at -, 298 N.E.2d at 832, it admitted that, upon demonstrating a 
"substantial governmental interest," the state could constitutionally abridge first amend• 
ment freedoms. - Mass. at -, 298 N.E.2d at 834. The burden of proving the 
existence of a sufficient interest, however, lay with the government, and the court 
concluded that the bill "furnishes no legislative findings or other indication of a 
substantial and overriding governmental interest that all newspapers and all other 
publications of general circulation in this Commonwealth publish all responsive, paid 
political advertisements of whatever nature or size." - Mass. at -, 298 N.E.2d at 831. 
The oourt recognized the problems of a monopolistic press but articulated counter-
vailing difficulties presented by reply statutes. The opinion stated that the broad scope 
of the bill exceeded the interest of the state in ensuring the publication of political 
ideas. Moreover, the court noted that a reply statute oould discourage the periodicals 
from accepting any political advertisements. - Mass. at -, 298 N.E.2d at 833-34. 
Unlike the Florida decision, the Massachusetts opinion distinguished the broadcast• 
ing cases from the newspaper situation. The court argued that the physical limitations 
of the airwaves, which arguably require regulation of broadcasters, see text at note 
48 supra, have no parallel in the newspaper industry. Nor did the court perceive any 
counterpart in the newspaper field to the rigorous licensing requirements imposed on 
broadcasters, which some have suggested indicate sufficient state action to require broad-
casters to grant access to the public. - Mass. at -, 298 N.E.2d at 834. 
The Massachusetts court found implicit support for its position in two recent 
Supreme Court Decisions. In Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Natl. 
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dom of the press is to provide an unimpeded flow of information to 
the public.9 Since the court found that the statute furthered this goal 
by ensuring an opportunity for full public discussion of controversial 
issues, it held the statute to be consistent with the first amendment.10 
The court asserted also that, as the Supreme Court has defended the 
Fairness Doctrine11 as a remedy for the monopoly held by a broad-
Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973), clarifying a broadcaster's obligations under the Fairness 
Doctrine (see note 11 infra), the Supreme Court allowed broadcasters wide discretion 
in presenting controversial issues. The Court refused to require broadcast licensees to 
grant access to political advertisers, and the Massachusetts court reached the same con-
clusion regarding newspaper publishers. - Mass. at -, 298 N.E.2d at 834. The state 
court noted that while the Supreme Court did not intend CBS to deny Congress the 
power to compel broadcasters to accept advertisements, it did uphold an FCC ruling 
denying access in the case before it. Thus, the Massachusetts court determined that 
CBS excluded any "right of access" from the realm of constitutional rights. - Mass. 
at -, 298 N.E.2d at 835-36. Furthermore, the court surmised that both the majority 
and dissenting opinions in the recent case of Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh 
Commn. on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973), in which the Supreme Court 
permitted regulation of commercial advertising in newspapers, suggested the in-
validity of regulating the content of political speech. - Mass. at -, 298 N.E.2d at 
834-35. On the assumption that commercial or business aspects of publishing are 
subject to regulation, however, the Supreme Judicial Court accepted the constitu-
tionality of display rate equality in the proposed bill. - Mass. at -, 298 N.E.2d 
at 835-36. 
9. 287 S.2d at 81·82. 
10. The court concluded that the statute "enhances rather than abridges free-
dom of speech and press." 287 S.2d at 80. An additional facet of the statute that 
the court found desirable was its specific focus on political campaigns, which ensured 
an element of fairness in elections. 287 S.2d at 80-81. The statute was applicable 
only to elections, rather than to all public issues, because the Florida legislature 
originally enacted it as part of a corrupt election practices act. 
11. The Fairness Doctrine provides "that discussion of public issues be presented 
on broadcast stations, and that each side of those issues must be given fair coverage. 
• • • It is an obligation whose content has been defined in a long series of FCC 
rulings in particular cases, and which is distinct from the statutory requirement of 
§ 315 of the Communications Act that equal time be allotted all qualified candidates 
for public office.'' Red_ Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 369-70 (1969) 
(footnote omitted). For the first formal announcement of the Doctrine by the FCC 
see Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949). 
The statutory right of reply for broadcasters, 47 U.S.C.A. § 315(a) (Supp. 1974), 
qmending 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1970), provides: 
If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for 
any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportuni-
ties to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting 
station: Provided, That such licensee shall have no power of censorship over 
the material broadcast under the provisions of this section. No obligation under 
this subsection is imposed upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by 
any such candidate. Appearance by a legally qualified candidate on any-
(1) bona fide newscast, 
(2) bona fide news interview, 
(3) bona fide news documentary (if the appearance of the candidate is 
incidental to the presentation of the subject or subjects covered by the news 
documentary), or 
(4) on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events (including but not lim-
ited to political conventions and activities incidental thereto), 
shall not be deemed to be use of a broadcasting station within the meaning 
of this subsection. Nothing in the foregoing sentence shall be construed as re-
lieving broadcasters, in the connection with the presentation of newscasts, news 
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caster, so could Florida impose a right of reply to counteract increas-
ing concentration in the newspaper industry.12 
The Supreme Court, per Chief Justice Burger, reversed the 
Florida supreme court in a two-tiered response. First, the Court cited 
as controlling previous opinions in which it had forbidden govern-
ment regulation of newspaper content, implying that the doctrine 
of stare decisis alone mandated its decision.13 Second, the Court 
warned that if publishers had to print responses to controversial 
columns, political and electoral coverage would be "blunted or re-
duced"14 as editors shied from news or commentary to avoid the 
requirements and penalties of reply statutes.15 Although the Court 
cited some of its own language16 that arguably supported a right to 
access, it relied on contrasting quotations suggesting that a "judicial 
gloss"17 circumscribes the first amendment and proscribes govern-
ment regulation of the editorial process. 
Advocates of access had not denied that a judicial gloss surrounds 
the first amendment, but they had questioned its applicability to the 
present structure of the newspaper industry. They asserted that the 
first amendment sought to guarantee the generation and dissemina-
tion of diverse ideas. In so far as the press has used its first amend-
ment freedom to secure its own financial and political position and 
to restrict access to its resources, they argued, it has frustrated this 
purpose and should be subject to corrective regulation. 
The access advocates ground their conception of the first amend-
ment in the requirements of a working democracy.18 This approach 
interviews, news documentaries, and on-the-spot coverage of news events, from 
the obligation imposed upon them under this chapter to operate in the public 
interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting 
views on issues of public importance. 
12. 287 S.2d at 82-83. The Florida court extended the broadcast-newspaper analogy 
by proposing the unique hypothesis that since newspapers use electronic media in trans-
mitting information, the principles of Red Lion apply to the press. 287 S.2d at 86-87, 
13. 418 U.S. at 254-57. 
14. 418 U.S. at 257. 
15. 418 U.S. at 257-58. 
16. "'Freedom to publish means freedom for all and not for some,'" 418 U.S. at 252, 
quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); the nation is com-
mitted to "'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open'" debate on public issues. 418 U.S. at 
252, quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
17. 418 U.S. at 254. 
18. In early cases interpreting the first amendment the Court envisioned free 
speech as a means of stimulating the circulation of a wide range of ideas. Justifications 
for free speech assumed that certain benefits inhere in the mere existence of what 
became known as a "marketplace of ideas." In advocating first amendment protection 
for the distribution of anti-war leaflets during wartime, Justice Holmes's dissent in 
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919), established the marketplace analogy 
and declared the discovery of truth to be the goal best served by its maintenance. 
Holmes's analogy to a marketplace developed into an analysis for upholding first 
amendment freedoms: Truth is a good to be sought after, truth is best discovered 
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emphasizes the importance of assuring that citizens have the informa-
tion prerequisite to the well-reasoned decisions essential to demo-
cratic govemment.19 Access advocates find support for their position 
in a line of decisions, culminating in New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van,20 in which the Supreme Court articulated the view that the first 
amendment serves self-government.21 The relative immunity from 
libel suits that the press won in that case was motivated not by the 
principle that newspapers should be free from legal obligations, but 
by a belief that immunity is necessary to "a profound national com-
mitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open . . . .''22 
Those who favor regulation of newspaper content perceive New 
York Times as an incomplete realization of their goals. Thus, al-
though Professor Jerome Barron23 welcomed the principle that news-
by competition among a multitude of ideas, and therefore a marketplace of ideas 
should be encouraged. See also Learned Hand's definition of the interest protected 
by the first amendment in Local 501, IBEW v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 1950). 
19. Barron, 80 HAR.v. L. REv. 1641, supra note 5, at 1653-56. 
20. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
21. This view has been most closely associated with the writings of Alexander 
Meiklejohn. See A. ME!KLEJOllN, PoLmCAL FREEDOM (1960); Meiklejohn, The First 
Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REv. 245. See also Brennan, The Supreme 
Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 73 HAR.v. L. REv. 
1, 11-12 (1965). The Court has idealized the role of the citizen and his willingness· 
to contemplate ideas set before him without questioning whether any individual 
makes good use of the available information. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 
665, 726 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("[e]nlightened choice by an informed citizenry 
is the basic ideal upon which an open society is premised"); Pickering v. Board of 
Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968) ("[t]he public interest in having free and unhindered 
debate on matters of public importance ••. [is] the core value of the Free Speech 
Clause of the First Amendment''); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967) ("[a] 
broadly defined freedom of the press assures the maintenance of our political system 
and an open society''). The Florida high court conceived of the first amendment 
as a means of allowing citizens to choose among diverse · views. Newspapers were 
required to grant a right of reply because, while "[t]here is a right to publish with-
out prior governmental restraint, • • • there is a correlative responsibility that the 
public be fully informed." 287 S.2d at 80. The court also noted that "[t]he statute 
here under consideration is designed to add to the flow of information and ideas 
and does not constitute an incursion upon First Amendment rights or a prior restraint 
since no specified newspaper content is excluded." 287 S.2d at 82 (emphasis original). 
It should be noted that access advocates assume that the individual citizen in fact 
uses the information to good effect. 
22. 376 U.S. at 270. The purpose of this principle seemed clear in light of the 
Court's acceptance of Madison's rationale for disputing the Alien and Sedition Acts. 
"[I']he Constitution created a form of government under which 'The people, not the 
government, possess the absolute sovereignty.'" 376 U.S. at 274, quoting Madison, The 
Report on the Virginia Resolutions, in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 
569-70 (1876), and "[t]he right of free public discussion of the stewardship of public 
officials was thus, in Madison's view, a fundamental principle of the American form of 
government.'' 376 U.S. at 275. 
23. Barron was among Tornillo's attorneys in the Florida case. His article in 80 
HARV. L. REv. 1641, supra note 5, has been instrumental in the latest round of argu-
ments for press regulation. 
192 Michigan Law Review [Vol. '13:186 
papers should further "uninhibited, robust and wide-open debate," 
he would accept press immunity only if the Court enforced a corol-
lary responsibility of the press to "allocate space equitably among 
ideas competing for public attention."24 The decision for him repre-
sents a "lost opportunity"25 in so far as it encourages newspapers to 
publish controversial matter but does not require them to do so. 
Proponents of access deem impositions on the press not only as 
proper in light of the requirements of a working democracy, but as 
warranted by the history of the first amendment. They urge that at 
the time of the amendment's adoption "the press was broadly repre-
sentative of the people it was serving"26 and provided a medium 
for lively debate. The framers intended freedom of the press 
to be a safeguard against governmental interference with these 
functions.21 Although the amendment has largely succeeded in curb-
ing governmental intrusions, economic developments unforeseeable 
in the eighteenth century have created a situation that access ad-
vocates believe presents as severe a threat as official intervention. 
Economic pressures have caused rapid decreases in the number of 
newspaper publishers,28 engendering an industry structure of "one 
newspaper towns." Access advocates allege that monopolistic pub-
lishers can easily refuse a forum to ideas they find offensive or con-
troversial or with which they simply disagree. The press can, in effect, 
practice the censorship of ideas that its freedom was intended to pre-
clude. Proponents of access do not distinguish private from govern-
mental interference with the free flow of ideas,29 and assert that a 
24, Barron, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1641, supra note 5, at 1660. 
25. Id, at 1657-60. 
26. 418 U.S. at 248. 
27. It is in this vein that advocates of access rely on the Supreme Court's declara• 
tion that first amendment guarantees are "not for the benefit of the press so much 
as for the benefit of all of us." Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374. 389 (1967). See also 
United States v. Powell, 171 F. Supp. 202 (N.D. Cal. 1959), in which the court granted 
a mistrial in a conspiracy case because local newspapers had printed "inflammatory 
articles and headlines." 171 F. Supp. at 204. The court, after rebuking the press for 
its publications, concluded that "freedom of the press is not for the benefit of the 
press but for the benefit of the people. Newspaper publishers, therefore, I1ave a high 
degree of responsibility to preserve the doctrine of freedom of the press for the benefit 
of the people, not for their own benefit." 171 F. Supp. at 205. 
28. The number of newspapers published in the United States has declined from 
12,115 in 1950 to 11,324 in 1973, in spite of a large growth in the American popula-
tion. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISIICAL AllSTRAcr OF THE UNITED STATES 502 (1973). 
One may argue, however, that the decline is part of a cycle rather than a continual 
downward trend. In 1970, 11,383 newspapers were published in the United States. 
Id. The number of newspapers fell from 10,176 to 6,884 during the Depression and 
rose to 10,282 by 1947. U.S. DEPT. OF COl\11\IERCE, STATISIICAL AllSTRAcr OF THE UNITED 
STATES 462 (1950). The Court in Tornillo recognized the contention that the dimin-
ished number of newspapers narrows the public's "ability to respond or to contribute 
in a meaningful way to the debate on the issues." 418 U.S. at 250. 
29. J. BARRON, supra note 3, at 69-72: Barron, 80 HARV, L. REv. 1641, supra note Ii, 
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sufficient state interest exists to require affirmative regulation of 
private publishers. 
Access advocates are especially concerned with newspaper con-
centration because they attribute to the communications industry a 
unique ability to influence citizens. They assert that media presenta-
tions to the reader or viewer control his knowledge and beliefs and 
determine his actions. If a newspaper avoids a controversy or refuses 
to present all viewpoints, therefore, it correspondingly limits or 
prejudices the citizen's approach to the issue. Access advocates thus 
find monopolization of a communications industry in a democracy to 
be inherently malignant.8° Concerned by what they label an "antipa-
thy to ideas," they suggest that "legal intervention [is necessary] if 
novel and unpopular ideas are to be assured a forum .... "81 
Access proponents do not believe that alternative methods of first 
amendment expression-handbilling, sound trucks, and picketing, 
for example--can adequately counteract bias or indifference in the 
mass media.82 They argue that the only satisfactory medium for re-
at 1641: Johnson &: Westen, A Twentieth-Century Soapbox: The Right To Purchase 
Radio and Television Time, 57 VA. L. REv. 574, 603.07 (1971). 
30. Justice Frankfurter characterized the press as having "a relation to the public 
interest unlike that of any other enterprise pursued for profit." Associated Press v. 
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 28 (1945) (concurring opinion). 
31. Banon, 80 HARV. L REv. 1641, supra note 5, at 1641. 
32. Id. at 1653. Banon propounds the theory of the "most adequate" forum, 
This appears to be equivalent to a right to be effective or to "persuade," see Canby, 
The First Amendment Right To Persuade: Access to Radio and Television, 19 
UCLA L. REv. 723 (1972), as well as to reach a specific audience, Apparently one 
gauges a speaker's effectiveness by comparing his impact with that of previous 
speakers on similar topics. See Canby, supra, at 730·32. A right to be effective requires 
individual access to mass media, not only because the advocate can thereby have 
the greatest impact on the greatest number of people, but also because the individual 
himself will present his position most persuasively. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 
Inc. v. Democratic Natl. Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 188-89 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting): 
Canby, supra, at 726; Johnson & Westen, supra note 29, at 585-86. 
Some commentators have asserted that a right of access is constitutionally com• 
pelled, arguing that newspaper publication constitutes state action and that refusals 
by the press to grant access to spokesmen for opposing views therefore violate first 
amendment prohibitions. They contend that either the press is so entwined in a 
relationship with the state that the former becomes a public or quasi-public agent, 
see Note, supra note 5, at 227-28, or, by providing a forum for controversy, the press 
performs functions traditionally performed by the state. See generally Lange, supra 
note 5. 
Recent cases, however, such as Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), 
suggest that a newspaper's exemptions from statutory requirements and subjection 
to duties to publish certain notices probably do not reflect the partnership or 
symbiotic relationship between press and state necessary to the state action argument. 
Nevertheless, the parameters of state action remain uncertain. Chief Justice Burger's 
opinion in Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Natl. Comm,, 412 U.S. 94 
(1973), indicates that the test for finding government participation in a privately 
owned enterprise depends more on epithetical jurisprudence than on any readily 
quantifiable criteria. Section ID of that opinion suggested that a broadcaster's · re-
fusal to accept paid political advertising does not constitute "governmental action" 
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sponse is the one in which the attack appeared. A statutory right of 
access to the identical medium would not only rectify shortcomings 
in press coverage but would have the incidental benefit of encourag-
ing citizens to engage directly in political debate. 
Several rationales supporting the statutory right of access center 
on the important and unique position of the press in society. Early 
arguments for regulation of the press alleged the newspaper industry 
to be so imbued with a public interest as to be subject to legislative 
control,33 a rationale that has justified government regulation of 
many private industries.34 Uhlman v. Sherman35 is a singular case that 
for first amendment purposes, despite the fact that government licenses and regulates 
broadcasters. The Chief Justice opined that while a broadcast licensee must meet its 
obligation as a "public trustee," the FCC's role in enforcing that duty was one of 
"overseer," 412 U.S. at 117, and not "partner." 412 U.S. at 119. The regulatory scheme 
established by Congress for the broadcast licensees was insufficiently "pervasive" to 
remove the journalistic discretion that made the licensee's actions essentially private, 
412 U.S. at 120. But see note 75 infra. 
Recent Supreme Court opinions have also rejected attempts to expand the public 
forum concept. In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), the Court 
found that a city-operated rapid transit system that sells advertising space on its 
vehicles does not constitute a first amendment forum. Thus, the city could legitimately 
bar political advertising from the transit system. 
More important to the argument that a newspaper constitutes a public forum, 
however, are cases that withdraw from the Court's previous willingness to subject 
owners of private property to constitutional restraints. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 
407 U.S. 551 (1972): Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539 (1972). The ability 
to regulate private property has emerged from a balancing process relying on and 
stressing the primacy of first amendment freedom of speech. E.g., Amalgamated Food 
Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 316 (1968). Although 
the Court has alluded to the "special solicitude" that courts "properly have shown 
••• for the guarantees of the First Amendment," Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 
551, 568 (1972), in the case of newspapers a countervailing first amendment right-
freedom of the press-contravenes the primacy of freedom of speech, Given the 
presumed equ;ility of freedom of press and freedom of speech, the addition of private 
property interests shifts the balance in favor of freedom of the press and away from 
access legislation. See generally Lange, supra. 
33. See Note, Newspaper Regulation and the Public Interest: The Unmasking of 
a Myth, 32 Prrr. L. REV. 595, 603-05 (1971). 
34. The Supreme Court examined the proposition that a private business could 
be subject to regulation if it is "affected with a public interest" in Munn v. Illinois, 
94 U.S. 113, 126 (1877). The Court held that the Illinois state legislature could 
regulate maximum rates for storage of grain. The factors upon which the Court 
relied were the importance of the business to the community at large and the 
monopolistic character of the business. The monopoly requirement was discarded 
in Brass v. North Dakota ex rel. Stoeser, 153 U.S. 391, 403-04 (1894). In Wolff Packing 
Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522 (1923), the Court, through Chief Justice 
Taft, postulated three categories of private business so affected with a public interest 
that they could be subjected to governmental regulation: 
I) Those which are carried on under the authority of a public grant of privi-
leges which either expressly or impliedly imposes the affirmative duty of rendering 
a public service demanded by any member of the public. Such are the railroads, 
other common carriers and public utilities. 2) Certain occupations, regarded as 
exceptional, the public interest attaching to which, recognized from earliest 
times, has survived the period of arbitrary laws by Parliament or Colonial leg• 
islatures for regulating all trades and callings. Such are those of the keepers 
of inns, cabs, and grist mills • • • • 3) Businesses which though not public at 
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contains dicta to this effect. In Uhlman a merchant accused compet-
itors of conspiring to persuade the town newspaper not to accept his 
advertisements. The court dismissed the charge for lack of evi-
dence. It expressed the view, however, that the newspaper's status 
as a quasi-public corporation bound it to accept the plaintiff's adver-
tisements.86 The court grounded this duty to the public on the 
favored position of the press under certain laws, its statutory duty to 
publish legal notices, the type of information it publishes, and its role 
in society. These factors, the court reasoned, made newspapers 
"amenable to reasonable regulations and demands of the public."37 
Although Uhlman stands alone as an example of judicial willingness 
to coerce publication, a few other courts have suggested that certain 
aspects of the newspaper industry infuse it with a public interest.88 
The Florida supreme court in Tornillo seemed to echo this analysis 
by emphasizing the role of newspapers in informing the public.89 
Apart from the Uhlman anomaly, courts have unanimously re-
jected regulation of newspapers under a public interest theory. The 
their inception may be fairly said to have risen to be such and have become 
subject in consequence to some government regulation. They have come to hold 
such a peculiar relation to the public that this is superimposed upon them. 
262 U.S. at 535 (citations omitted). The concept was expanded, or arguably abandoned 
on behalf of a broader principle, in Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. W. Reference & Bond 
Assn., 313 U.S. 236, 246-46 (1941). The Court, upholding a statute fixing maximum 
compensation for private employment agency services, cited an attack on the "af-
fected with a public interest" standard in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 536 
(1934), and asserted that such a standard was not the proper measure of a statute's 
validity. 
35. 22 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 225, 31 Ohio Dec. 54 (C.P. Defiance County 1919). 
36. The court declined to issue a mandatory injunction against the newspaper 
because sufficient damages had not been proved. The court articulated its theory 
for the benefit of the parties, should the case return to court for a decision on the 
merits. 
37. 22 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) at 233, 31 Ohio Dec. at 62. 
38. In its consideration of a statute limiting rates to be charged by newspapers 
or radio stations for political advertisements, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire 
contended that while newspapers are not public utilities they are subject to the 
police power. Since the statute was interpreted as assuring election fairness (the 
rationale used in Tornillo to require regulation of content rather than business 
practice), rather than suppressing or censoring the press, the court upheld its validity. 
Chronicle &: Gazette Publishing Co. v. Attorney Gen., 94 N.H. 148, 48 A.2d 478 
(1946). The court also noted, however, that "[t]he present statute does not compel the 
plaintiff or any other newspaper to accept political advertising." 94 N.H. at 152-53, 
48 A.2d at 481. A vigorous dissent suggested that the newspaper industry may be 
completely beyond the reach of legislation. 94 N.H. at 154-56, 48 A.2d at 482-83. 
Although the Supreme Court of Michigan upheld the right of newspapers to 
reject advertisements for adult movies, Bloss v. Federated Publications, Inc., 380 
Mich. 485, 157 N.W .2d 241 (1968), a dissenting judge questioned the status of the 
press as a private business and suggested that the decision not be so broadly stated 
as to preclude a right of access in monopoly situations, 380 Mich. at 491, 157 ·N.W .2d 
at 244. 
89. 287 S.2d at 82. 
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theory has been rejected even where newspapers have monopolized40 
and where a paper has thwarted legislative requirements by refusing 
to print public notices.41 I}. sorrowful lack of articulation of the rea-
soning in these cases, however, diminishes their value. They are 
largely self-perpetuating, each one merely citing previous decisions 
for the proposition that newspapers are beyond regulation by the 
government.42 
More persuasively, one may argue that past applications of the 
public interest theory have justified government regulation of busi-
ness aspects of an industry only, and provide no support for regula-
tion of newspaper content. The Supreme Court has clearly drawn 
this distinction: In submitting the press to antitrust prosecutions,48 
NLRB orders,44 and requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act,4" 
the Court has consistently observed that the regulations at issue af-
fected business concerns rather than content.46 The Court has differ-
entiated regulations that would impinge upon first amendment inter-
ests from valid regulations that apply to all businesses, including the 
press.47 
Closely allied to the public interest theory is the argument that 
the same factors that justify government regulation of broadcasters 
allow regulation of the press. Access proponents do not argue that 
the press shares the problem of physical limitations, which is one ra-
tionale for broadcast regulation. Both courts and administrators have 
40. Approved Personnel, Inc. v. Tribune Co., 177 S.2d 704, 706 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1965); J.J. Gordon, Inc. v. Worcester Telegram Publishing Co., 343 Mass. 142, 143, 177 
N.E.2d 586, 587 (1961); Shuck v. Carroll Daily Herald, 215 Iowa 1276, 1281, 247 N.W. 
813, 815 (1933). 
41. See, e.g., Mack v. Costello, 32 S.D. 511, 143 N.W. 950 (1913). 
42. See, e.g., In re Louis Wohl, Inc., 50 F.2d 254 (E.D. Mich. 1931): Bloss v. 
Federated Publications, 5 Mich. App. 74, 145 N.W.2d 800 (1966), afld., 380 Mich. 485, 
157 N.W .2d 241 (1968). A notable exception is the historical analysis by the Supreme 
Court of Iowa of industries traditionally held to be affected with a public interest 
in Shuck v. Carroll Daily Herald, 215 Iowa 1276, 247 N.W. 813 (1933). 
43. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); Associated Press v. 
United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Indiana Farmer's Guide Publishing Co. v. Prairie 
Farmer Publishing Co., 293 U.S. 268 (1934). 
44. Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937), 
45. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946); Mabee v. White 
Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178 (1946). 
46. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. I, 20 n.18 (1945), in which 
Justice Black, applying antitrust laws to press associations, noted that 
[i]t is argued that the decree interferes with freedom "to print as and how one's 
reason or one's interest dictates." The decree does not compel AP or its members 
to permit publication of anything which their "reason" tells them should not be 
published. It only provides that after their "reason" has permitted publication 
of news, they shall not, for their own financial advantage, unlawfully combine to 
limit its publication. 
47. See, e.g., Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 155-56 (1951); 
Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1946); Mabee v. White 
Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178, 184 (1946); Associated Press v, NLRB, 301 U.S. 
103, 132-33 (1937). 
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emphasized that the finite number of frequencies in the electromag-
netic spectrum requires a licensing scheme that prevents interference 
by broadcasters with each other.48 The broadcast analogy argument 
focuses instead on the similar dangers to the fulfillment of first 
amendment interests that arguably plague both industries. Present 
regulation of broadcasters ·concerns more than the problem of 
physical restrictions. Regulations affecting the content of broadcasts, 
such as the Fairness Doctrine,49 reflect the fear that the limitation on 
the number of broadcasters inherent in a licensing scheme might 
result in an undesirable narrowing of viewpoints on political issues. 
Although defenses of government regulation of broadcasting have 
depended upon the fiction that the ainvaves belong to the people, 
thus requiring their use in the public interest,50 implicit in the regu-
lation of content lies the notion that all responsible views should have 
an opportunity to reach the public.51 Thus the Federal Communica-
tions Commission promulgated the Fairness Doctrine to ensure that 
"radio [would] be maintained as a medium of free speech for the 
general public as a whole rather than as an outlet for the purely per-
sonal or private interests of the licensee."52 
The parallel danger to first amendment interests in the newspaper 
industry stems from currently prevailing economic conditions. 
Profitable newspaper publication allegedly requires taking advantage 
of economies of scale, which only papers or newspaper chains with 
large circulations can achieve. This situation hinders the establish-
ment of new newspapers and contributes to the failure of existing 
papers. Consequently, economic limitations create the same potential 
for monopoly of political viewpoints that physical limitations create 
in the broadcasting industry. It is thus anomalous to allow regula-
tion of the broadcast media and not newspapers. 
The Supreme Court's opinion in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. 
Federal Communications Commission53 contains analysis and lan-
guage that arguably support the media of access proponents to 
48. Columbia Broadcasting Sys,, Inc. v. Democratic Natl. Comm., 412 U.S. 94-, 103-04-
(1973): Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375-77 (1969): National Broad-
casting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210-17 (194-3): FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio 
Station, 309 U.S. 470, 474 (1940); Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 
16, 40-41, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973). 
49. See note 11 supra. 
50. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Natl. Comm., 412 U.S. 94 
(1973): Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
51. Such a contention is closely related to the idea that the communications media 
play a unique and influential role in a democracy. See notes 26-31 supra and accom-
panying text. 
52. Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1257 (1949). The Supreme 
Court upheld the Doctrine for similar reasons: it would allow legislation that would 
increase "the voices and views presented to the public." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. 
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 401 n.28 (1969). 
53. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
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analogize from broadcast media to the press. The Court in Red Lion 
upheld the Fairness Doctrine against a free speech challenge; it estab-
lished that in an area of scarce resources the Congress and the FCC 
do not "violate the First Amendment when they require a radio or 
television station to give reply time to answer personal attacks and 
political editorials."54 Asserting that the goal of the first amendment 
is the creation of an "informed public capable of conducting its own 
affairs,"55 the Court found that enforcement of the Fairness Doctrine 
"enhance[s] rather than abridge[s]"56 the accomplishment of this aim. 
The Court feared that a contrary decision would sanction "unlimited 
private censorship in a medium not open to all,"57 and thereby con-
travene the spirit of the first amendment. Advocates of access to news-
papers would make the existence of scarcity and not its source the 
determinative factor, and thereby equate the newspaper and broad-
cast situation.58 
In justifying infringements of licensees' first amendment rights,119 
in designating licensees as public trustees, 60 and in promulgating and 
validating rules61 for them, the courts and the FCC have repeatedly 
emphasized the unique nature of the broadcast media. Even if one 
accepts the much-criticized argument that physical scarcity compels 
54. 395 U.S. at 396. 
55. 395 U.S. at 392. 
56. 395 U.S. at 375. 
57. 395 U.S. at 392. 
58. Indeed, at least one commentator has interpreted Red Lion as signaling a di-
rect attack on the present structure of press ownership, rather than simply providing 
analogies thereto. Professor Barron has written that "[m]y point is that Red Lion 
is not just a broadcast case. It is a media case. It represents a look at the first amend-
ment in the light of new social realities of concentration of ownership and control 
in :a few hands • • • • It is in the background of these realities that the new first 
amendment right of access spoken of by Mr. Justice White should be understood." 
.Barron, 48 TEXAS L. REv. 766, supra note 5, at 771. A "first amendment right of 
access," however, was not established in Red Lion. Justice White himself, in Columbia 
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Natl. Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973), admitted that 
"Congress intended that there be no right of access such as claimed in these cases." 
412 U.S. at 147 (White, J., concurring) (emphasis original). 
59. "Any regulation of radio, especially a system of limited licensees, is in a real 
sense an abridgment of the inherent freedom of persons to express themselves by 
means of radio communications. It is, however, a necessary and constitutional abridge• 
ment in order to prevent chaotic interference from destroying the great potential 
of this medium for public enlightenment and entertainment." Editorializing by 
Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1257 (1949). 
60. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Natl. Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 110-14 
(1973); Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1247 (1949). 
61. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-90 (1969). Summarizing 
the majority's argument in Red Lion, Chief Justice Burger :tated that "Mr. Justice 
White's opinion • • • makes clear that the broadcast media pose unique and special 
problems not present in the traditional free speech case. Unlike other media, broad-
casting is subject to an inherent physical limitation." Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 
Inc. v. Democratic Natl. Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973). See also Pittsburgh Press 
Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm. on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 387 (1973). 
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regulation of broadcasting content,62 distinctions between electronic 
communications and the press may defeat the analogy from one in-
dustry to the other. The crucial issue, then, is whether economic fac-
tors today in fact create in the newspaper industry a situation tanta-
mount to the situation that precipitated broadcast regulation. Does 
the need to control the power of a concentrated and unfettered press 
to mold opinions constitute the compelling state interest that access 
advocates must demonstrate to justify legislation infringing on first 
amendment rights?63 
Uncertainties in proof underlie the broadcast analogy in at least 
four respects. First, recent studies indicate that weak competition in 
the newspaper industry has been a consequence of inadequate en-
forcement of antitrust laws as well as of the need to achieve eco-
nomies of scale.64 I£ the dearth of newspapers65 is traceable to anti-
competitive practices, it may be preferable to attack the problem by 
enforcing the fair trade and antitrust laws instead of imposing con-
tent regulations. 
Second, the extent to which the press actually denies a forum to 
controversial viewpoints is unknown. While the few examples given 
in pro-access literature66 surely do not exhaust the instances in which 
newspapers have denied access to deserving spokesman, no empirical 
data exist on the number of refusals. Such data would provide a more 
valid measure of the state's interest in regulating the press than does 
the unproved hypothesis that monopoly publication leads to irre-
sponsible publication. 
62. The Fairness Doctrine is not without opponents. For arguments that similari-
ties between broadcasting media and the press should lead to greater broadcasting 
freedom, rather than to newspaper regulations, see Goldberg, A Proposal To De-
regulate Broadcast Programming, 42 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 73 (1973); Kalven, Broad-
casting, Public Policy and the First Amendment, 10 J. LAw & ECON. 15 (1967); 
Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Obseroations on 40 Years of Radio 
and Television Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REv. 67, 150-63 (1967); Note, Concepts of 
the Broadcast Media Under the First Amendment: A Reevaluation and a Pro-
posal, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 83 (1972). 
Some commentators have argued that the advent of cable television and the sub-
sequent multiplicity of channels available in any one area has vitiated the "physical 
scarcity'' rationale for the Fairness Doctrine. But see Canby, supra note 32, at 744-46. 
63. See, e.g., Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308-09 (1965) (Brennan, 
J., concurring); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 
U.S. 415, 438 (1963). . 
64. Flynn, Legislation-Antitrust and the Newspapers: A Comment on S. 1312, 22 
VAND. L. REv. 103, 122-25 (1968); Roberts, Antitrust Problems in the Newspaper 
Industry, 82 HARv. L. REv. 319, 352-66 (1968). 
65. The assertion that such a dearth exists should not be accepted too swiftly. See 
note 28 supra. 
66. Standard cases relied on by proponents of regulation include Amalgamated 
.Clothing Workers v. Chicago Tribune Co., 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970); Cook v. 
Advertiser Co., 323 F. Supp. 1212 (M.D. Ala. 1971), afjd., 458 F.2d 1119 (5th Oir. 
1972); Resident Participation of Denver, Inc. v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Colo. 
1971). 
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Third, advocates of access have not adequately defined the com-
munications counterpart of the product market that must be defined 
in a claim of monopoly under the Sherman Act.67 On the assumption 
that the various media differ in impact, proponents of right to reply 
regulation have rejected the argument that the availability of alterna• 
tive communications media mitigates the effects of concentration in 
newspapers. 
Such an assumption reveals the fourth weakness in the argument 
that there is a compelling need to regulate content. Proponents of 
access embrace the proposition that information and opinion pur-
veyed by a medium strongly influence its audience. The actual im• 
pact of the mass media, however, may be too imprecise to satisfy the 
compelling state interest standard. Studies of voter reactions to 
political advertisements tend to support Professor Louis Jaffe's con-
tention that the causal relationship between television68 and "polit-
ical consciousness" is not clear enough to provide the necessary basis 
for legislation. 69 A survey of reactions to political commercials during 
the 1972 presidential campaign reveals that, while there was an in-
verse relationship between the effect on the viewer of advertisements 
and the degree of his political interest, many viewers simply voted 
according to their previous dispositions.7° Furthermore, the survey 
found that the ability of television commercials to penetrate voter 
resistance was no greater than that of political messages in other 
media,71 
Aside from these empirical deficiencies, the broadcast analogy 
founders on a difference between the root of the monopoly sup-
posedly ameliorated by broadcast regulations and the source of con-
centration in the newspaper industry. Because broadcasters are 
governmentally licensed monopolies, one may defend the Fairness 
Doctrine as a means of avoiding any appearance of partisanship in the 
allocation of licenses. Lack of government participation in the estab-
lishment and operation of newspapers, however, makes this argument 
inapplicable to them. 
The preceding analysis suggests that neither the public interest 
theory nor the broadcast analogy persuasively validates access statutes. 
If such statutes would in fact further the first amendment goal of 
67. See, e.g., United States v. E.I, du Pont de Nemours &: Co., 351 U.S. 877 (1956); 
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244 (D.R.I. 1964), afjd. except as to decree, 
384 U.S. 563 (1966). 
68, Any argument that calls into question the impact of television advertisements 
would seemingly apply to newspaper editorials. 
69. Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of the Broadcaster: Reflections on Fairness 
and Access, 85 HARv. L REv. 768, 768-71 (1972). But see Canby, supra note 32, at 
739-41. 
70. New York Times, Feb, 17, 1974, § I, at l'l, col. 1 (late city ed.). 
71. Id. 
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providing the information necessary to informed self-government, 
however, then this analysis does not adequately meet the pro-access 
arguments. 
There are, however, alternatives to the "informed self-govern-
ment" interpretation of first amendment goals. The Supreme Court's 
decision in Tornillo suggests a different theory of freedom of the 
press that, if accepted, would vitiate access statutes. Throughout the 
last part of the opinion, Chief Justice Burger alluded to the need to 
protect editorial discretion from governmental interference, despite 
the possibly undesirable consequences of press autonomy. Although 
freedom of the press was obviously proffered in the hope that news-
paper publication would benefit the community, Burger concluded 
that the press may not be coerced in any way to serve the public, be-
cause a "responsible press" is neither mandated by the Constitution 
nor attainable by legislation.72 Indeed, one may infer from Burger's 
opinion that the press is granted total autonomy for the very purpose 
of avoiding governmental decisions concerning the adequacy of its 
performance.73 
The Chief Justice has emerged as the Court's leading proponent 
of the autonomy theory; in the process he has articulated an almost 
boundless range of editorial discretion. In Columbia Broadcasting 
System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee,74 Chief Justice 
Burger suggested that only two factors-the need to attract readers 
and advertisers and the journalistic integrity of editors and joumal-
ists-c~mld limit the editorial power of a private newspaper.75 Ac-
72. 418 U.S. at 256. Presumably, press autonomy would still be limited by the 
need to protect public safety or national security. See New York Times Co. v. United 
States, 403 U.S. 713, 725-27 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
A recent article from the New York Times, Dec. 30, 1973, § I, at 15, col. 6 (late city 
ed.), points out the type of irresponsibility that may be a cost of press freedom: 
Winchester's new antipomography ordinance may not take effect because the 
local newspaper says its language is not in good taste. 
In an article explaining the position, Richard Wise, publisher of the Win-
chester News Gazette and Journal Herald, said: . 
''We are not questioning the wisdom of the ordinance itself or the constitu-
tional right of persons to buy or sell such material. Rather, we are simply exercising 
our right to print only matter which we feel is reasonable or tasteful and we 
do not believe the language with definitions is in good taste." 
Winchester ordinances must be printed in a Winchester newspaper of general 
circulation in order to take effect, and Mr. Wise has the only one. 
If the purpose of the ordinance is merely to provide notice to the residents of 
Winchester, perhaps other means can be found. The existence of alternatives, how-
ever, does not eliminate the embarrassment that advocates of a free press must feel 
upon realizing that private enterprise may use constitutional shields to frustrate the 
workings of a democratically elected government. 
73. 418 U.S. at 258 &: n.24. 
74. 412 U.S. 94 (1973). 
75. 412 U.S. at 117. Although Chief Justice Burger wrote the majority opinion 
in CBS, only two other justices concurred in the part of the opinion in which he 
expressed his view of press autonomy. Dissents from that part, however, were directed 
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cordingly, editorial discretion is so broad that governmental regula-
tion of newspapers is forbidden not only with respect to content, but 
also as to matters that will tangentially affect content, such as the size 
of the paper and the costs of printing and composing time and ma-
terials.76 Indeed, in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission 
on Human Relations77 the Chief Justice dissented from an opinion 
holding that a city ordinance could constitutionally forbid news-
papers to carry "help-wanted" advertisements in sex-designated 
columns, on the ground that freedom of the press includes the right 
of a newspaper to arrange the content of its columns as it sees fit.78 
If the Court adopts the autonomy theory interpretation of the 
first amendment, as perhaps it has in Tornillo, all proposals to legis-
late newspaper responsibility in order to achieve some other end, 
such as informed self-government, would be indefensible. Even if the 
Court maintains the view that the first amendment seeks to 
strengthen self-government, however, a statute that compels news-
papers to publish specific material may in fact frustrate that goal. 
The remainder of this note will consider the possible effects that an 
access statute would have on the very first amendment values access 
advocates claim it will further. 
Even if one accepts the proposition that the framers of the first 
amendment sought to strengthen self-government by encouraging 
the free :flow of information, self-government requires more than the 
mere dissemination of ideas. It also contemplates participation by 
the citizenry-not only through exercise of the franchise but through 
constant discussion of public issues. Tp.e first amendment, therefore, 
requires the maintenance of an atmosphere in which citizens feel 
free to engage in unhampered political expression. 70 
The courts have recognized that the right of expression is fragile 
and that the exercise of protected speech may be easily defeated.80 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has drawn a broad mantle of pro-
at the Chief Justice's conclusion that broadcasting does not constitute state action 
rather than at the press autonomy discussion. See also 412 U.S. at 120-21. 
76. Tomillo, 418 U.S. at 256-57. 
77. 413 U.S. 376 (1973). 
78. 413 U.S. at 394-95. 
79. Thus, in a town meeting, the institution "commonly, and rightly, regarded 
as a model by which free political procedures may be measured," Meiklejohn affords 
to every man "a right and a duty to his think own thoughts, to e.xprcss them, and 
to listen to the arguments of others." A. ME1KLEJOHN, supra note 21, at 24. His 
oft-quoted remark that "[w)hat is essential is not that everyone shall speak but 
that everything worth saying shall be said," id. at 26, reveals not the desirability of 
nonparticipation but only a recognition of the need to regulate speech when many 
wish to speak at once. 
80. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965); Bantam Books, Inc, v, Sullivan, 
372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963), 
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tection around first amendment expression. The safeguards include 
a sweeping definition of protected speech and strict scrutiny of at-
tempts to regulate first amendment expression for any deterrent ef-
fects on participation in political discussions. 
The Supreme Court has attempted to protect all speech con-
ceivably within the scope of the first amendment; toward this end 
it has given the words of the free speech clause an expansive read-
ing. 81 Breadth of coverage alone, however, will not accomplish first 
amendment ends if those who would otherwise speak hesitate for fear 
that their words will later be wrongly interpreted to be outside the 
sphere of protection. 82 The Court has thus immunized certain libelous 
speech because to allow its repression could stifle dissemination of 
valuable information. The series of libel cases beginning with New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan83 illustrates the importance the Court 
attaches to this principle.84 Witness the Court's statement that if 
81. Freedom of press should be afforded the same latitude as freedom of speech. 
Professor Chafee has noted: 
'\\Te are concerned with freedom of the press rather than with freedom of speech 
generally. Does the separate recognition of these two privileges in the First 
Amendment have any importance for us? Is constitutional "freedom" somewhat 
different in scope for "the press" than for "speech"? Not for the most part. They 
appear virtually to coincide as legal concepts. I have not found the courts men-
tioning any significant difference between these two freedoms in that respect. 
There is, however, a difference in fact so far as governmental control is concerned, 
for newspapers are more vulnerable than speakers. 
z. CHAFEE, supra note 6, at 34-35. See also United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar 
Assn., 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967). 
82. Courts should thus avoid exceptions to the amendment that depend on flexible 
conditions, such as the market structure of the newspaper industry, since changes 
in those conditions would threaten the consistent application of first amendment 
principles. 
83. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
84. After New York Times the Court set aside numerous libel verdicts concerning 
public figures. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Curtis Publishing 
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
The Court has e.xtended broad protection to other areas of first amendment 
expression. In Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963), the petitioner chal-
lenged the constitutionality of a Rhode Island statute creating a commission that 
sought to prevent the distribution of allegedly obscene literature to youths under 
18 years of age. The Supreme Court noted lower court findings that the commission's 
tactics intimidated book and magazine dealers and suppressed the sale and circula-
tion of certain books. Although some of the books may have been obscene· within 
the Court's previous definition of that term, the Attorney General of Rhode Island 
had conceded that others were not. The Court thus struck down the entire scheme 
as one curtailing "constitutionally protected expression, which is often separated 
from obscenity ouly by a dim and uncertain line." 372 U.S. at 66. The sanctity of 
the first amendment required that the absence of formal censoring procedures not 
preclude the abolition of schemes encouraging self-censorship when the result would 
be to restrict arguably constitutional speech. The Court found support for its deci-
sion in the vulnerability of first amendment expression "to gravely damaging yet 
barely visible encroachments. Our insistence that regulations of obscenity scrupulously 
embody the most rigorous procedural safeguards ••• is therefore but a special instance 
of the larger principle that the freedoms of expression must be ringed about with 
adequate bulwarks." 372 U.S. at 66 (citation omitted). 
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the freedoms of expression are to have the "~reathing space" that 
they "need •.. to survive," misstatements of this kind [negligently 
made libels] must have the protection of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments .... 
Neither lies nor false communications serve the ends of the 
First Amendment, and no one suggests their desirability or further 
proliferation, but to insure the ascertainment and publication of 
the truth about public affairs, it is essential that the First Amend-
ment protect some erroneous publications as well as true ones.Bu 
Although the protection of newspapers that publish falsehoods is 
startling, the decisions have a convincing rationale.BB Even libels may 
initiate beneficial discussion that would not othenvise easily begin.B7 
Moreover, unless newspapers can print stories with impunity after a 
reasonable attempt to validate their data, they may decide not to in-
vestigate leads and subjects they might othenvise pursue. Instead of 
risking these losses, the Court has opted for a broad interpretation of 
the first amendment, finding the protection of certain libelous state-
ments preferable to the potential exclusion of valuable information. 
The same rationale that justifies the Court's limitation of cul-
pable libel militates against statutory rights of reply and access. If 
potentially libelous statements can generate beneficial discussion, 
might not this also be true of a newspaper's political endorsements 
or expressions of editorial opinion? And, if the Court fears the 
deterrent effect of libel suits on first amendment expression, would 
not the constant need to litigate the scope of a newspaper's obligation 
under access legislation engender similar fears? 
The Court has articulated the "chilling effect" doctrine to accom-
modate these concerns. The doctrine permits a court to strike down 
an othenvise valid law if it adversely affects the rights of free speech, 
The Court has also deemed administrative censorship in Post Office regulations 
to be unconstitutional, Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971), and has developed the 
concept of overbreadth to strike down statutes that in part proscribe behavior pro• 
tected by the first amendment. See Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doc-
trine, 83 HARv. L. R.Ev. 844 (1970). 
85. Time, Inc. v, Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 292 (1971), quoting New York Times v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964) and St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 
(1968). 
86. Justice White, concurring in Tornillo, noted that "[o]f course, the press is 
not always accurate, or even responsible, and may not present full and fair debate 
on important public issues. But the balance struck by the First Amendment with 
respect to the press is that society must take the risk that occasionally debate on 
vital matters will not be comprehensive and that all viewpoints may not be ex-
pressed." 418 U.S. at 260. 
87. For example, a newspaper may publish a report concerning public officials 
that, while itself untrue, leads to clarifications that add to the public's knowledge 
of those officials. An example is the controversy surrounding Henry Kissinger's role in 
ordering national security wiretaps. See Kissinger's response to the controversy in 
N,Y. Times, June 12, 1974, at 34, cols. 1-8, 35, cols. 1-8 (late city ed.). 
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press, or assembly.BB A statute is vulnerable to this analysis even if 
infringement of first amendment rights is not its primary or intended 
purpose; it is enough that there is an incidental or indirect chilling 
of protected behavior.B9 
The utility of a chilling analysis in the reply statute context de-
pends upon the proof required to establish a chilling effect. Because 
statutes challenged under this analysis by definition affect first 
amendment rights only indirectly,90 conclusive proof of deterrence 
would be difficult. A standard that requires a chilling effect to be 
only a possible, rather than a necessary, consequence seems proper.91 
A recent articulation of the Court's chilling effect analysis suggests 
that accurate measurement of a deterrent effect is unnecessary. 
A statute cannot stand if analysis of it produces, "on the basis 
of common sense and available information,"92 an affirmative an-
swer to the questions: "(l) whether there [is] a rational connection 
between the cause (the governmental action) and the effect (the deter-
rence or impairment of First Amendment activity), and (2) whether 
the effect would occur with some regularity .... " 93 
These tests would be met when applied to reply statutes. Con-
fronted with a statutory right of reply,94 a newspaper publisher faces 
88. The term also appears in a variety of non-first amendment cases. See Note, 
The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 CouJM, L. REv. 808, 832-4() (1969). But 
see Malone v. Emmet, 2'78 F. Supp. 193, 200-01 (M.D. Ala. 196'7). 
89. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 12-13 (19'72) (dictum). 
90. See NAACP v. Alabama, 35'7 U.S. 449, 461 (1958) ("[t]he governmental action 
challenged may appear to be totally unrelated to protected liberties"). Cf. Bates v. 
Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960). 
91. But cf. United Mine Workers v. lliinois State Bar Assn., 389 U.S. 21'7, 222 
(196'7): 
The First Amendment would, however, be a hollow promise if it lefi govern-
ment free to destroy or erode its guarantees by indirect restraints so long as no 
law is passed that prohibits free speech, press, petition, or assembly as such. We 
have therefore repeatedly held that laws which actually affect the exercise of 
these vital rights cannot be sustained merely because they were enacted for the 
purpose of dealing with some evil within the State's legislative competence. 
(Emphasis added.) 
92. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 733 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
93. 408 U.S. at 733-34 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See also Davis v. !chord, 442 F.2d 
1207, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1970), in which the court defined the considerations inherent 
in determining the existence of a chilling effect as including "the source of the chill, 
the e.xtent to which it focuses upon the conduct of those who allege it, and the 
likelihood that it will affect that conduct." 
Justice Douglas has noted that the "monetary and other burdens" imposed on the 
press by right of reply statutes are as onerous as other "indirect" restrictions that 
the Court had struck down as possibly chilling first amendment expression. Columbia 
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Natl. Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 168 n.18 (19'73) (Doug-
las, J., concurring). After listing several such cases, Douglas concluded that "[i]n 
each instance we held the restriction unconstitutional on the ground that it dis-
couraged or chilled constitutionally protected rights of speech, press, or association." 
412 U.S. at 169 n.18. 
94. As will become apparent, this argument does not apply to access statutes, 
which grant publishing space whenever the publisher covers a public issue inadequately. 
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a difficult choice. He may either publish his views and allow the 
presentation of contrary opinions or he may withhold his comments, 
thereby both shunning controversy and avoiding the necessity of 
granting reply space. If he chooses the latter course, the statute will 
have produced results diametrically opposed to those intended.0G 
That there is a rational connection between the statute and the pub-
lisher's silence can hardly be doubted, and, although hard evidence 
is not available, silence does not seem an unlikely result. 
Assuming the requisite "chill" has been demonstrated, the Court 
has traditionally balanced the "chilled" right against the govern-
mental purpose that the statute purports to serve.00 The Court has 
heavily weighted the scales in favor of first amendment values-it 
upholds chilling statutes only when the state can demonstrate a 
"compelling" interest07 and a "relevant correlation" between the 
power sought and the aim to be achieved.98 
The balancing with respect to access statutes is speculative. We 
do not know how much information escapes the public because news-
papers refuse to publish it. Nor do we have empirical data that in-
dicates the extent of refusals. This ignorance creates a tension be-
tween the competing first amendment values of furthering access and 
avoiding chilling effects. Given that the chilling effect doctrine ad-
vances goals similar to those supposedly served by access legislation, 
and given that the need for and workability of an access right were 
not clearly established, the Court in Tornillo apparently resolved 
the dilemma in favor of maintaining the potency of the chilling effect 
doctrine. 
In an enigmatic part of its opinion the Court recognized that the 
Florida reply statute might deter publishers' exercise of their first 
amendment rights. The Court noted that editors faced with the reply 
statute "might well conclude that the safe course is to avoid con-
troversy and that ... political or electoral coverage would be blunted 
or reduced."99 The Court did not use the phrase "chilling effect" and 
cited no language that would indicate the degree to which that doc-
trine had previously been employed.100 Even so, the Court's use of a 
95. Recognizing the possibility of a chilling effect, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court spoke of a proposed bill to regulate newspapers, see note 8 supra, 
as a "paradox." The court stated that the bill's object of fairer dissemination of 
newspaper advertising could, in fact, discourage newspapers from accepting any po• 
litical notices. Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, - Mass. -, 298 N.E,2d 829, 
833-34 (1973). 
96. See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1949); Note, supra note 88, 
at 823-24. 
97. Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960). 
98. Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 525 (1960). 
99. 418 U.S. at 257. 
100. The Court cited New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and a 
statement in Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966), to the effect that one of the 
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"chilling" analysis in an opinion that struck down a reply statute in-
dicates the primacy of the interest of preventing chilling effects. 
There are reasons aside from those mentioned by the Court why 
the statute at issue in Tornillo is vulnerable to a chilling analysis. 
The Florida law provided criminal penalties for noncompliance,101 
thereby reinforcing the reluctance of editors to publish material that 
would require response. Even without criminal penalties, however, 
reply statutes present additional, indirect deterrents to the publica-
tion of controversial material. To include these deterrents under the 
chilling effect rubric might stretch that doctrine, but since they pro-
duce the same result that traditional chilling analysis seeks to prevent 
they are constitutionally relevant. · 
No less an advocate of access than Professor Barron has recognized 
that the implementation of an access or reply right will create a host 
of practical problems that will ultimately require adjudication.102 
The ability of the judiciary to draw lines and to set standards for 
those who enforce the right provides Barron's solution to these prob-
lems.103 Answers would result from case-by-case judicial resolution. 
Since questions of fairness can arise in a multitude of situations, only 
constant adjudication over a period of time would generate compre-
hensive guidelines defining access obligations. 
Reliance on the judiciary, however, overlooks a vital point: The 
litigation necessary to ascertain the scope of the right of access or 
reply in a given instance entails such heavy costs that one who would 
othenvise speak may choose the alternative of silence. Reliance on 
time,consuming and expensive court suits as a means of resolving 
access questions ignores the possibility that newspapers will react to 
reply statutes by "steer[ing] far wider of the unlawful zone"104 than is 
purposes of the first amendment was to protect free discussion of governmental affairs. 
418 U.S. at 257. But the Court ignored statements that would have more strongly 
supported its conclusion. In New York Times, for instance, the Court had disallowed 
libel actions against newspapers by public officials without a showing of malicious 
intent because "would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing 
their criticism ••• because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or the fear 
of the expense of having to do so." 376 U.S. at 279. 
101. See note 1 supra. 
102. It is by the judicial process that we shall establish the contours for answers 
to questions which a working right of access obviously presents. What is a 
minority :point of view? When and where shall such opinions be heard? Has 
some significant space already been given to the particitlar controversy? Must 
every issue of the publication contain a reference to a particular controversy? 
Isn't it possible to reach saturation of a given subject? When is the decision not 
to publish on a particular issue a "news" decision and when is it a decision based 
upon an effort to obstruct the opinion process? 
Barron, 37 GEO. WASH, L. REv. 487, supra note 5, at 496. 
103. Id. at 495-97. See also T. EMERSON, THE SYSIEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSlON 
670 (1970). 
104. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958). 
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necessary, in order to avoid the cost and uncertainty of judicial de-
termination.100 
Difficult questions would inevitably arise regarding the scope of a 
reply statute, exacerbating the litigation threat to first amendment 
expression. If newspapers alone are covered, are weekly newspapers 
subject to the same requirements as dailies? If so, should not weekly 
magazines be similarly regulated? Should coverage extend to all maga-
zines, regardless of frequency of publication? Professor Barron an-
swers that no publication could refuse space for purely ideological 
reasons. But even that standard would require litigation that may im-
pose deterrent costs on the press. 
In accordance with the principle that uncertainty or the risk of 
large expenditures may chill free speech,106 the Supreme Court has 
struck down procedures that would result in protracted litigation to 
determine the first amendment rights of the parties.107 The District of 
Columbia Circuit applied this principle in the freedom of the press 
area in Washington Post Co. v. Keough.108 Keough, a United States 
congressman from New York, brought a libel suit against the Post 
and columnist Drew Pearson. The court reversed the court below and 
granted summary judgment for the defendants. Judge Wright indi-
cated that summary judgment was a remedy that courts should not 
hesitate to use in cases involving a first amendment issue that might 
otherwise require protracted litigation. Protracted litigation, Wright 
speculated, might lead to self-censorship.100 If the expense and time 
demands of a libel lawsuit chill first amendment expression, the fact 
that the suit concerns a demand for reply space rather than a libel 
should have no significance. 
There are additional ways in which a reply statute might deter 
first amendment expression. The statute might cause a publisher to 
hesitate to express himself on certain topics for fear that his position 
105. For an argument that this principle applies to the protection of newspaper 
sources see Note, Reporters and Their Sources: The Constitutional Right to a Con-
fidential Relationship, 80 YALE L.J. 317, 341 (1970). 
106. [SJanctions against either innocent or negligent misstatement would rresent 
a grave hazard of discouraging the press from exercising the constitutiona guar-
antees .••• A broadly defined freedom of the press assures the maintenance of 
our political system and an open society. Fear of large verdicts in damage suits 
for innocent or merely negligent misstatement, even fear of the expense involved 
in their defense, must inevitably cause publishers to "steer • • • wider of the 
unlawful zone," • • • and thus "create the danger that the legitimate utterance 
will be penalized." 
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374,389 (1967) (citations omitted). 
107. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958). See also Rosenbloom v. Metro-
media, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52-53 (1971) (opinion of Brennan, J.). 
108. 365 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1011 (1967). 
109. Noting that the Times doctrine sought not only to protect persons against 
libel suits but also to prevent discouragement of first amendment expression, Judge 
Wright found that limitations must be imposed on lawsuits brought by public offi• 
cials. 365 F.2d at 968. See also note 106 supra. 
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will invite ridicule or scorn that he would have to publish in his own 
paper.11° The publisher may also hold back for a tactical reason, 
fearing that an immediate reply would undermine his position be-
cause the respondent, having the last word, might more easily im-
plant his ideas in the mind of the reader.111 
Access advocates answer that the increased number of different 
opinions in print more than compensates for the publisher's loss. This 
reasoning is based on the right to be effective, or to "persuade.''112 It 
is by invoking the right to be effective that access advocates create a 
conflict bet\veen the usually concurrent first amendment rights of 
free speech and free press. The conflict could theoretically be re-
solved by declaring that one's freedom to speak in reply to a news-
paper attack is satisfied by a response in another forum. This solution 
would avoid regulation of the press while allowing a speaker to ad-
dress an audience on the issue, albeit a smaller or different audience 
from that which heard the attack. The disparity in the audience is 
simply a cost required by the need to maintain press freedom. Access 
proponents reject this alternative by asserting a comparative right in 
one speaker to choose his forum so as to be as effective as was another 
speaker on the same topic.113 
But the Supreme Court has never recognized such a right; nor has 
it permitted a speaker to ascertain the limits of his own effective-
ness.114 On the contrary, despite language that it will not deny access 
to public forums merely because alternatives exist, 116 the Court has 
denied access to even the most traditional forums when countervail-
ing rights so required.116 This balancing process appears most accept-
110. Such an attitude would especially deter the propagation of radical or novel 
ideas, with which access advocates seem most concerned. 
111. The right of access occupies a somewhat different status from the other 
First Amendment rights we're talking about. Access, the right to reach the pub-
lic, is not part of the First Amendment in and of itself. Suppose the English 
governor had told Tom Paine that he could go ahead and pubijsh all he liked, 
but at the back of his pamphlets he would have to allow the governor's assistant 
to publish his views to guarantee that he had given the other side. That would 
have preserved Tom's right of free speech, but far from being an implementation 
of the First Amendment it would have been just the opposite. • . • The First 
Amendment does not require the government to enable everyone to reach the 
public at large •••• 
Ashland, Broadcasting and the First Amendment: Report on a Center Conference, 6 
CENTER MAGAZINE, May-June 1973, at 19, 43 (statement by A. Scalia). 
112. See Canby, supra note 32. 
113. Barron, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1641, supra note 5, at 1653; Canby, supra note 32, 
at 730-32. Canby argues that the true value of access lies in the impact of the subse-
quent spot advertisements. He holds that the validity of access should therefore not 
be tested by a standard that questions the informational value of a speaker's state-
ment. 
114. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36 (1973). 
115. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939). 
116. E.g., Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (speaker addressing unruly 
crowd); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (use of sound equipment in streets). 
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able when the speaker's right conflicts with the freedom of the press. 
Even if a reply statute did not cause a publisher to withhold his 
opinion entirely, it might well "chill" his first amendment expression 
by inducing him to dilute the strength of the statements he does make. 
Florida required newspapers to grant reply space only to those candi-
dates for public office whom they assailed.117 A publisher aware of facts 
that he believes should keep a candidate from office might seek to 
circumvent the statutory requirement by forgoing a direct attack on 
that candidate and choosing instead to endorse the latter's opponent. 
Although his endorsement may implicitly reflect criticism of the dis-
favored candidate, a statute that encourages indirect attacks hardly 
furthers robust political debate. 
Although the Court in Tornillo recognized that a reply statute 
may deter first amendment expression, its avoidance of "chilling 
effect" language may indicate an aversion to the doctrine. Several 
recent decisions hint that the Court has begun a reevaluation of the 
chilling effect analysis. In Laird v. Tatum,118 a 1972 opinion de-
livered by Chief Justice Burger, the Court upheld a district court 
determination that army surveillance of civilian activities did not 
unconstitutionally chill respondents' first amendment rights. The 
Court, however, did not reach this conclusion through a balancing 
approach; it denied that the surveillance created any chilling effect.110 
The Court required proof of such an effect by a showing of immedi-
ate danger or direct injury as the result of the challenged govern-
mental action.120 Since respondents could demonstrate no immediate 
injury or threat of injury, but only the possibility of later misuse of 
gathered information, 121 they were denied relief. While the require-
ment of immediate danger or direct harm may reflect only the tradi-
tional requisite that a chilling effect potentially threaten first amend-
ment rights, it suggests that those who challenge statutes on chilling 
grounds must carry the greater burden of linking their proposed activ-
Lloyd v. Tanner Corp., 407 U.S. 551 (1972), retreats substantially from the posi-
tion that the Court expressed in Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939), by holding 
that a balancing of alternative forums may support a finding that one forum may be 
sacrificed if another is available. The Court in Lloyd stressed private property interests 
in holding that handbillers must use "adequate alternative avenues of communica-
tion." 407 U.S. at 566-67. 
117. See note 1 supra. 
118. 408 U.S. 1 (1972). 
119. 408 U.S. at 11-13. The Court could have reached the same result by admitting 
the existence of a chilling effect and employing a balancing test to gauge its adequacy. 
The surveillance program was undertaken for the colorably valid purpose of inform-
ing army personnel entering an area of the local conditions, and its scale had been 
significantly reduced at the time of the decision. 408 U.S. at 5-7. 
120. 408 U.S. at 13. 
121, 408 U.S. at 18-14. 
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ity to a specific government sanction. This would be a departure from 
the "breathing space" rationale of traditional chilling effect analysis. 
A further distinction that the Court made in Laird could, if it 
matures into a new test, significantly diminish the doctrine's utility. 
In distinguishing Laird from cases in which the Court had in-
validated government action as chilling, Chief Justice Burger 
delineated certain categories. In each of the cases in which chilling 
was found "the challenged exercise of governmental power was 
regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature, and the complain-
ant was either presently or prospectively subject to the regulations, 
proscriptions, or compulsions that. he was challenging."122 This 
categorical approach was not essential to the Court's holding, and the 
Court did not state that the categories exhausted the cases in which it 
would find unconstitutional chilling. The listing of categories, how-
ever, is a sharp and unfortunate deviation from the Court's previous 
balancing test. The utility of the chilling effect analysis lies in the 
security it lends to potential participants in political discussion that 
they will not suffer penalties for their expression. A categorical 
approach, however, reduces that security in so far as speakers must 
fit their claims of a chilling effect into nebulous classifications that 
yield no predictable result. For instance, one might argue that Ta-
tum's assertion that information might be used against him at a later 
date constituted a valid challenge to governmental power that was 
"proscriptive . . . in nature" and that made the complainant "pro-
spectively subject to the ••. proscriptions ... that he was challeng-
ing." 
The Court's decision to deny newsmen an absolute privilege to 
keep their sources of information confidential128 may also signal a 
departure from the traditional test for chilling effects. In Branzburg 
v. Hayes Justice White's opinion for the majority took note of the 
argument that "the flow of news will be diminished by compelling 
reporters to aid the grand jury in a criminal investigation. . . .''124 
The opinion spoke not of a chilling effect, however, but of "the 
inhibiting effect . . • on the willingness of informants to make dis-
closures."125 
Inhibitions on the flow of news differ somewhat from the deter-
rents to the exercise of first amendment rights that are the objects of 
a chilling test.126 Nevertheless, the similarity of the language in 
122. 408 U.S. at ll. 
123. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
124. 408 U.S. at 693. 
125. 408 U.S. at 693. 
-126. The term "chilling effect" refers to the direct effect that governmental action,. 
has on an individual, rather than the secondary effect of the individual's subsequent 
inaction. In classical chilling cases the speak~ is also the individual disseminating 
the information. In Branzburg the speaker, or source of information, is chilled from 
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Branzburg to that of chilling effect analysis suggests a close analogy 
to chilling cases. It may also portend a more difficult standard of 
proof. Justice White characterized as "not irrational"127 the fear that 
the flow of news would diminish if newsmen were not granted a 
privilege. This characterization would seem to fulfill the previously 
accepted test for unconstitutionally chilling statutes. Yet, the ma-
jority in Branzburg required more. Although empirical data-
previously unnecessary to establish a chilling effect-supporting the 
reporters' argument was available, the opinion concluded that "the 
evidence fails to demonstrate that there would be a significant con-
striction of the flow of news to the public if this Court reaffirms the 
prior common-law and constitutional rule regarding the testimonial 
obligations of newsmen. Estimates of the inhibiting effect of such 
subpoenas on the ·willingness of informants to make disclosures to 
newsmen are widely divergent and to a great extent speculative."128 
The categorical approach used in Laird and the "significant con-
striction" standard of Branzburg may be anomalies in first amend-
ment law; this would account for the failure of the Court to discuss 
or distinguish those cases in Tornillo. Since Chief Justice Burger 
employed neither a traditional chilling analysis nor a categorical or 
"significant constriction" standard, however, one may argue that the 
Branzburg and Laird approaches are still operative. They may even 
have been applied without discussion in Tornillo. If this interpreta-
tion is accurate, its consequences are unfortunate. A requirement of 
a definite showing that a statute will inhibit first amendment rights 
before it will be invalidated neglects the possible reactions to such a 
statute. The deterrent effect may not be demonstrable, not only be-
cause one cannot determine how much critical expression would have 
appeared but for the statute, but also because the statute might in-
duce a publisher to mollify the attacks he does make.129 To place the 
burden of proving these indirect and immeasurable effects on the 
plaintiff contravenes the solicitude that the Court has heretofore 
shown for first amendment expression. 
While a chilling effect analysis militates against implementation 
of a right of reply, it is less effective in abrogating a right of access, 
which would permit other spokesmen to use the newspaper's columns 
whenever the newspaper failed to present adequately all sides of a 
controversy. Many of the practical costs that inhere in the chilling 
analysis, however, would also be relevant in determining the de-
sirability of an access statute. Although these costs do not reach the 
giving information to another person, the reporter, who would be the actual dis-
seminator. 
127. 408 U.S. at 693. 
128, 408 U.S. at 693-94 (footnote omitted, emphasis added). 
129. See text following note 117 supra. 
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level of a constitutional argument, as the chilling analysis does, they 
might, in light of the indefinite need for access that has been demon-
strated,180 indicate the undesirability of creating a right of access. 
The potential litigation costs that would chill a publisher faced 
with a right of reply would also exist in the access setting. Con-
ceivably courts would have to determine repeatedly whether a news-
paper had granted one side of a controversial issue sufficient space 
to avoid opening its columns to a nonpress spokesman for that side. 
If the paper is confronted ·with an access statute that requires presenta-
tion of all sides of a controversy, it might have to omit either news 
items it would otherwise print or revenue-producing advertisements. 
The Court in Tornillo perceived these additional costs, together with 
·the time requirements and costs of printing and composing materials, 
as a "penalty on the basis of content of a newspaper."131 
An access or reply statute providing that the paper need accept 
only paid commentary or rebuttal would solve this problem but 
create another: Only ideas advocated by persons with sufficient funds, 
who are unlikely to be of unorthodox persuasions, would be guaran-
teed access. The ideas of poor persons would have little more op-
portunity for exposure than they have at present.132 
The real possibility that an uncooperative newspaper could emas-
culate access legislation might be a final blow to the law's purported 
efficacy. Given the clear right of newspapers to print endorsements 
of candidates at any time prior to an election, 133 a right of access or 
reply would be useless to unendorsed candidates if the original 
editorial appeared on election eve or election day. Or, by refusing 
to grant access until threatened with a lawsuit or court order, a news-
paper could assure that the response would be printed only after the 
issue had become stale, again frustrating the aims of access legislation. 
Even if the Court in Tornillo had seen fit to deal with all of the 
arguments posed by access advocates, it would properly have reached 
the same result. Deeper analysis reveals that the access arguments are 
ill-founded. The broadcast analogy founders on factual and policy 
distinctions. Furthermore, enactment of a reply statute might well 
have strong deterrent effects on a newspaper's promulgation and 
130. See text at notes 63-71 supra. 
131. 418 U.S. at 256. A newspaper would face tbe same choice in tbe context of a 
reply statute if it published an editorial tbat provoked response. 
132. Former FCC Commissioner Nicholas Johnson has suggested tbat one means of 
avoiding financial discrimination while granting an absolute right of access would be to 
specify issues and amounts of time tbat broadcasters would be required to allocate. 
In re Democratic Natl. Comm., 25 F.C.C.2d 216, 230 (1970) (dissenting opinion). The 
majority attacked tbis proposal on tbe basis of tbe licensee's inability to prejudge 
tbe amount of time tbat a speaker would require for an effective address. 25 F.C.C. at 
228. See also Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Natl. Comm., 412 U.S. 
94, 123 (1973). 
133. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966). 
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publication of ideas. Indeed, the legislation would be self-defeating 
to the extent that the press would become less willing to engage in 
public debate. Finally, access legislation entails practical costs and is 
easily avoidable by a determined newspaper. Despite the supreme im-
portance of a fair press in a democracy, methods other than access 
legislation will have to be found in order to assure press respon-
sibility.134 
134. Self-regulation by nongovernmental press agencies may be the most viable 
constitutional alternative. See THE TwENTIETH CENTuRY FUND TASK FORCE, A FREE AND 
R.Esl'ONSIVE PRESS 1-11 (1973); Ritter &: Leibowitz, Press Councils: The Answer to Our 
First Amendment Dilemma, 1974 DUKE LJ. 845. 
